Why doesn't the Broad Front drop below 40%?

I have been wondering for a long time why Frente Amplio never seems to drop below that 40% of electoral support.
It is true that it used to be higher. But even after disastrous administrations—such as Mujica's—it not only did not collapse, but it also won the following government. Today, in the face of an administration that in several respects may be even worse, that hard core remains intact.

How can this be explained?
It is not an ideological question. It is a structural question

The mechanism

Frente Amplio built its identity by criticizing the traditional parties, especially the old Partido Colorado: corporatism, statism, clientelism, spending, and power based on distribution.
When it came to power, it replicated that same model.

It was not a rupture, but a reissue of the heaviest Batllismo: more taxes, more regulation, more State, and above all, more public employment.

That growth was not accidental. It was political.

During its governments, the number of public employees grew massively, until it formed a universe close to 300,000 civil servants. It is not just a fiscal problem: it is a mechanism of electoral anchoring.

The logic is simple.
More State implies more people dependent on it.
More dependence implies more captive votes.

It is not ideology. It is incentive.

Not all public employees vote for Frente Amplio, but the incentive is clear: when your income and stability depend on statism, voting for whoever expands it is a rational decision.

This is how an unmovable electorate is consolidated that defends mistakes, waste, and mediocre administrations. The famous 40% is not mystique: it is structural.

The territorial proof

The political map confirms it.

In the interior, Frente Amplio usually loses. It wins few departments and in exceptional fashion. Montevideo, on the other hand, is its permanent stronghold.

It is not a coincidence. The capital concentrates most of the state apparatus: the largest municipality, ministries, public entities, and companies. Wherever the State carries more weight, the Frente Amplio vote is more solid.

The same phenomenon is observed in the interior with Partido Nacional: public employees tend to vote for the party that controls the municipality. The color changes, not the logic.

The underlying problem

The size of the Uruguayan State is not only disastrous because of its economic inefficiency or its tax burden.
It is worse: it blocks political change.

An oversized State not only impoverishes: it immobilizes. It expands to sustain votes, and those votes sustain its expansion.

The productive society ends up being held hostage by an organized minority, with clear and concentrated interests.

As Milton Friedman explained, in a democracy small groups with strong incentives usually prevail over dispersed majorities, which pay the cost but do not have the same incentive to organize.

It is not a mistake.
It is a model.

Meanwhile, as long as that model is not broken, Uruguay will remain trapped in a State that not only spends and regulates, but also votes to preserve itself.