Protecting a minor ultimately protects the crime

Every rule produces something more than what it declares. It also modifies behaviors. When a society rewards an action, it gets more of it; when it increases its cost, it gets less. The law does not exist outside of that logic. Each norm alters the map of consequences within which millions of people decide what to do, what to avoid, and how far to take risks.

This dimension was once again exposed in the province of Buenos Aires. Judge Marta Elba Pascual suspended the application of the new Juvenile Criminal Regime for 60 days, which reduced the age from 16 to 14 years at which there can be criminal consequences within a specific regime for adolescents. The magistrate invoked the risk of collapse of the Buenos Aires institutions and the need to avoid potential violations of rights.

The discussion is often framed as a conflict between two sensitivities: those who want to punish and those who want to protect minors. That framing is insufficient. The central issue is not how much punishment a society desires, but what behavior it incentivizes when it radically separates a conduct from its consequences.

A fourteen-year-old does not necessarily possess the maturity of an adult. The law can recognize that difference through specific penalties, procedures, and conditions. But from that, it does not follow that it should legally consider irrelevant their capacity to understand that killing, stealing, or exercising violence causes harm to another person.

Responsibility then serves a function prior to punishment. It teaches that decisions have consequences. That connection constitutes one of the most fundamental institutions of any social order. It exists in the family, in contracts, in school, in work, and in practically all human interactions.

When the law breaks that connection absolutely, an additional problem arises. If two people can commit the same act but face radically different costs due to a known characteristic in advance, the system introduces an opportunity. Crime also responds to incentives. A lesser expected consequence can turn the minor not only into someone protected by the norm but into someone functionally more convenient for committing certain crimes.

It is not necessary to assume that all adolescents will rationally calculate a penalty before acting. Incentives do not require that each individual knows the Penal Code. It is enough that those who organize criminal activities perceive which behaviors face lower risks. Where there is a systematic difference in costs, there is also the possibility of exploiting that difference.

The case of Kim Gómez starkly showed the moral dimension of the problem. The seven-year-old girl died in 2025 after two teenagers stole the car she was in; one of them was 14 years old and was deemed not criminally responsible under the previous regime. The tragedy does not alone demonstrate what each penalty should be, but it does compel us to remember that protecting the potential perpetrator can never mean making the real victim invisible.

The Buenos Aires judicial decision adds another paradox. The argument is that the provincial system might not be prepared to receive more young people affected by the new regime. But administrative incapacity has a dangerous consequence when it becomes the basis for suspending responsibility. If the State mismanages its institutions, the cost of that inefficiency ultimately shifts to those who may suffer from the crime.

A serious society can discuss what penalties correspond to each age, how reintegration should occur, and what conditions juvenile centers should meet. What it should not do is confuse compassion with the absence of consequences. The former recognizes human differences. The latter alters the incentives that govern coexistence.

Freedom can only exist where each person is accountable for the harm they cause to another. A society that systematically disconnects action and responsibility does not become more humane. It simply changes who bears the cost.

Because the true limit of any protection policy appears when, in trying to spare consequences for the aggressor, it ends up transferring them to someone who never chose to be a victim. A justice that forgets incentives can end up protecting exactly what it intended to prevent.