While the World Cup distracted people, Orsi and Oddone took the opportunity to go against dollar savings

In the days when Uruguayans passionately followed each match of the 2026 World Cup, discussing plays and chances of qualification, the Central Bank of Uruguay moved forward with a measure that did not go unnoticed by those who closely observe the economy. Under the administration of Yamandú Orsi, the issuing entity put a regulatory project up for consultation that requires banks to provide customers who open or already hold dollar accounts with an explicit and signed warning about the "risks" of that decision.

The text that savers must sign is clear in its purpose: it reminds them that the value of their deposits in foreign currency, expressed in pesos, may decrease due to exchange rate fluctuations and that they could "recover less than what they deposited in terms of local purchasing power." There is no equivalent warning for those who choose pesos. The declared objective is to "contribute to the process of dedollarization" of an economy where, by the end of 2025, deposits from the non-financial sector (families and businesses) in private banks and the BROU totaled the equivalent of US$ 44.963 billion, of which 73% was denominated in dollars.

Uruguay is among the top three countries in the world with the highest percentage of dollarization of deposits. This figure represents approximately US$ 32.823 billion in dollar deposits solely in the local financial system. Additionally, Uruguayan residents hold around US$ 62 billion in deposits and financial investments abroad.

This is not a simple informational note. It is a deliberate step to disincentivize a practice that millions of Uruguayans have adopted as a rational defense of their assets. Over the past three decades, according to the Central Bank's own president, Guillermo Tolosa, Uruguayans have lost almost half of their purchasing power due to a lack of trust in the national currency. Holding dollars is not an ideological whim or a speculative bet: it is the logical response of people who have learned, through their own history, that the peso can erode the value of accumulated work.

What the government and the Central Bank present as "information for more informed decisions" has an immediate practical effect. At the same time that they require signing that warning (which will come into effect generally on August 1, 2026, and must be personally notified to all existing customers before December 31, 2026), the banking reserves are modified. For dollar deposits, the reserves remain unchanged: 28% for those under 180 days and 20% for longer-term deposits. In contrast, for peso deposits, a gradual reduction of the reserve ratios applicable to short-term obligations has been established, seeking to generate greater incentives to operate in the national currency.

The institutional message is consistent with a vision that considers dollarization a problem in itself. The president of the BCU has pointed out that when a Uruguayan deposits in dollars, 65% of those funds end up being exported or fleeing abroad because companies in the country do not want that currency. "A country that has enormous needs of all kinds to grow cannot afford to export two-thirds of its savings," he argued.

The real problem is not that people choose dollars. It is that the peso, over time, has not offered enough stability to compete on equal terms. When a government decides to attack citizens' choices instead of creating the conditions for the peso to be a reliable currency, it is acting on the symptom and leaving the cause intact.

Interventions that distort savings and credit incentives often generate effects that go beyond the immediate. They reduce trust in the formal financial system, push part of the savings towards less visible channels or directly abroad, and ultimately limit banks' capacity to grant productive loans. With US$ 32.823 billion in dollars deposited locally and another US$ 62 billion abroad, any measure that increases friction on those funds has a potentially significant impact on the liquidity available for the real economy.

Uruguayans who hold dollars in the local banking system are not financing foreign deficits out of ignorance. They are protecting the fruit of their efforts against a recurring history of policies that prioritize public spending over monetary stability. Forcing banks to provide a kind of "financial octagon" — a highlighted warning that must be signed — does not change that reality. It only adds friction, distrust, and an additional cost to those who have already decided, with their own money and experience, what the best way to preserve value is.

Measures of this type rarely remain isolated. Once it is accepted that the State can "guide" savings decisions through asymmetric regulations and institutional messages, the way is opened for subsequent steps: higher regulatory costs, differential taxes on the profitability of assets abroad (progress has already been made in this regard with changes to the IRPF since 2026), or more direct restrictions. Each intervention generates pressures for new interventions when the results are not as expected.

Meanwhile, people continue to work, save, and decide how to protect what they have built. The government, on the other hand, chooses the moment when public attention is focused elsewhere to move in a direction that, far from strengthening the national currency, erodes trust in the institutions that manage it. With US$ 44.963 billion in deposits from the non-financial sector and a dollarization of 73%, the numbers speak for themselves: Uruguayans have already voted with their money.

This move during the World Cup did not go unnoticed by those who understand that the economy is not built on paternalistic warnings or regulations that punish prudent decisions. It is built when the rules are stable, predictable, and respectful of people's ability to manage their own assets. Everything else ends up being, simply, an additional cost borne by society as a whole.